






13. A Framework for Assessing  
Public–Private Partnerships 
 





CosaNostra Pizza #3569 is on Vista Road just down from Kings Park Mall. Vista 
Road used to belong to the State of California and now is called Fairlanes, Inc. 
Rte. CSV-5. Its main competition used to be a U.S. Highway and is now called 
Cruiseways, Inc. Rte. Cal-12. Farther up the Valley, the two competing highways 
actually  cross.  Once  there  had  been  bitter  disputes,  the  intersection  closed  by 
sporadic sniper fire. Finally, a big developer bought the entire  intersection and 
turned it into a drive-through mall. Now the roads feed into a parking system – not 
a  lot,  not  a  ramp,  but  a  system  –  and  lose  their  identity.  Getting  through  the 
intersection  involves  tracing  paths  through  the  parking  system,  many  braided 
filaments of direction like the Ho Chi Minh trail. CSV-5 has better throughput, but 
Cal-12 has better pavement. That is typical – Fairlanes roads emphasize getting 
you there, for Type A drivers, and Cruiseways emphasize the enjoyment, for Type 





With the widened attention to privatization in its many forms, one may think 
that private roads are just around the bend, that travelers will soon drive on 
commercialized streets and highways and eschew public sector arteries. That 
was the vision portrayed by Neil Stephenson in his novel of the near-future 
Snow Crash, quoted above. However a world of unregulated private roads is 
a fear confronting those who currently control the roads sector as well as 
science fiction authors. While the archetypal private road may include no 
public involvement, most recent private efforts in the highway sector to date 
have  either  been  government  contracts,  franchises,  outsourcing,  or  have 
required  government  assistance.  They  certainly  require  government 
permission and have been subject to extensive government oversight. These 
are often referred to as ‘public–private partnerships’. 
Public–Private  Partnerships,  also  known  as  P3  or  PPP,  are  contracts 
between  government  agencies  and  private  businesses  that  involve  the 
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government agency paying, reimbursing or transferring a public asset to the 
private sector in return for goods or services over a set time period.  
PPP  have  existed  for  centuries  (Levinson  2002).  The  turnpike  era  in 
England beginning in the 1650s and in the United States beginning in the 
1790s, both lasting until the second half of the nineteenth century, illustrate 
many forms of public–private partnerships. In England, roads were organized 
as trusts, quasi-public corporations, chartered by Parliament, but with the aim 
of  earning  a  profit.  There  was  significant  oversight,  the  right  to  operate 
turnpikes was not in perpetuity, but had to be renewed by Parliament. When 
turnpike organizations went bankrupt (often due to the rise of railroads), they 
were taken over by local government. Toll farming, the selling of the right to 
collect  tolls,  was  another  aspect  of  private  involvement,  reducing  public 
sector risk (in principle) by exchanging a lump sum payment for the right to 
collect  tolls  (which  were  subject  to  the  vagaries  of  demand  and  required 
entrepreneurship and incentive for enforcement). PPPs are returning to the 
forefront because governments do not have the fiscal resources and, in some 
instances, knowledge, to keep up with the public demand for better services. 
As stated by the National Council for Public–Private Partnerships (2002): 
 
The confluence of rising infrastructure needs and social demands, combined with 
tight governmental budgets and public resistance to additional tax increases, has 
made  it  essential  for  public  authorities  to  turn  to  the  innovative  qualities  and 
access  to  operating  capital  possessed  by  the  private  sector  in  order  to  fulfill 
responsibilities. 
 
However,  the  private  sector  is  motivated  by  profits,  and  so  may  give 
insufficient  weight  to  quality  or  safety  for  the  general  public.  Before  the 
partnership  is  initialized,  two  questions  must  be  answered:  does  the 
partnership add efficiency in use of limited resources, and will the public be 
better served by the partnership? (NCPPP 2002) Both partners will have risk 
involved with the partnership. The private businesses will have to risk their 
own time and money, and will have to disclose financial conditions to the 
public. The public sector risks overcharging by the private partners, being 
forced  into  a  poor  negotiating  position,  and  the  potential  for  declining 
benefits over time.  
Many elements of the highway transportation system are already private. 
Drivers and passengers expend their own time in producing highway trips. 
Drivers  generally  own  their  vehicles,  so  those  too  are  private.  Roadside 
services (gas, food, lodging) are almost always private, and are necessary 
elements  for  many  kinds  of  trips.  While  in  some  cases  these  may  be 
concessions on government owned land (rest stops on toll roads), on most 
highways they are on private land. The origin and destination of the trip are 
also  generally  in  the  private  sector;  these  trip  generators  (generation 
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facilities) may be analogous to the generating plants in the electricity sector. 
The  roads  themselves,  however,  are  not  generally  private.  These  network 
components  are  at  issue  in  the  discussion  of  partial  partnerships  to  full 
privatization of roads. 
Much discussion about private roads focuses on the flexibility and choices 
provided to travelers. A network with largely, or entirely, private elements 
would  be  very  different  than  the  one  we  face  on  a  daily  basis.  Just  as 
deregulation of communications created radically new products and services 
that were unimagined at the time, divestiture of highways may do similar 
things. However, unlike the American telecommunications sector, streets and 
highways  are  government  owned.  Furthermore,  highways  are  presently 
financed through gas taxes and general revenue, rather than priced according 
to use or a contract between service provider and consumer. 
There is clearly reluctance to privatize; otherwise we would already be 
living in a world with private streets and highways. This chapter explores the 
mechanisms  of  partnerships  in  creating  private  involvement  in  the  road 
sector. Ultimately, we would like to be able to answer a number of questions 
related to PPPs: 
 
•  Is the public better served by PPPs than either public or private control? 
•  If so, why are relatively few PPP initiatives? 
•  Why do some PPP work and others do not? 
•  Which institutional arrangements are the most successful? 
•  What regulatory oversight is required? 
•  What levels of the road systems are best suited to partial or full private 
involvement? 
 
We will not answer all of these questions in this chapter; though we develop 
a methodology we hope will allow us to answer these in future research. 
This chapter reflects on the increasing interest in PPP, as they will be used 
to procure the design, construction, maintenance, operation and financing of 
major transport infrastructure. The main types of PPP are given including a 
brief description of existing PPP projects. The next sections give in detail 
implementations of PPP initiatives, providing detailed examinations of two 
US cases: the Alameda Corridor in California, and the Dulles Greenway in 
Virginia, as well as the Tagus River Bridge in Portugal, and the Luas System 
in  Dublin,  Ireland.  The  prospects  for  the  future  of  Public–Private 
Partnerships are then discussed. 
 
 
13.2 TYPOLOGY AND THEORY 
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When there are two entities (the public and the private sector), there must be 
two  objectives:  welfare  and  profit.  Those  objectives,  while  not  entirely 
coincident, may not be totally mutually exclusive.  The successful Public–
Private  Partnerships  should  both  increase  the  quality  and  quantity  of  the 
public service and allow the private business to make a profit. Under PPPs, 
upgrades and construction to major infrastructure projects can move ahead 
more  quickly  than  the  government’s  current  timeframe  using  its  own 
stretched financial resources. The government agency entering a partnership 
hopes  to  achieve  value  for  money  through  shorter  construction  periods, 
streamlined contracts and a simplified procurement process. Through PPPs, 
any combination of public and private investment is possible; the idea being 
that for every unit of public money put into a project, private money would 
also be injected.  
The main types of Public–Private Partnerships are (USGAO 1999): 
 
•  Build–Own–Operate (BOO): The private business builds and operates a 
public facility and retains legal ownership 
•  Build–Operate–Transfer (BOT): The private business builds and operates 
the public facility for a significant time period. At the end of the time 
period, the facility ownership transfers to the public 
•  Buy–Build–Operate  (BBO):  The  government  sells  the  facility  to  the 
private business. The private business refurbishes and operates the facility 
•  Design–Build–Operate (DBO): A single contract is awarded to a private 
business which designs, builds, and operates the public facility, but the 
public retains legal ownership 
•  Build–Develop–Operate  (BDO):  The  private  business  buys  the  public 
facility, refurbishes it with its own resources, and then operates it through 
a government contract. 
 
More  broadly,  we  can  think  of  a  continuum  of  governance  structures  
between private and public as suggested by Table 13.1. 
We can ask as a broader question how do roads fit into market economy. 
Roth (1998) suggests that weaknesses of the current road system include: 
 
•  Lack of ownership. 
•  No accountability to customers. 
•  Absence of pricing. 
•  Not financially independent. 
 
Table 13.1  Realms of Private and Public Involvement 
 
      Private Roles 
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Public  Public  Federal Government  none 
    State Government  none 
    Local Government  none 
    Homeowners 
Association 
none 
    Utility Quasi-Public 
Authority 
Build, Own, Operate 
  Outsourcing Service Contract 
 
Operations and Maintenance 
    Management Contract  Design, Build 
Design, Build, Major 
Maintenance 
Design, Build, Operate 
 
  Franchise  Project Franchise   
 
Lease, Develop, Operate 
Build, Lease, Operate, Transfer 
Build, Transfer, Operate 
Build, Operate, Transfer 
Build, Own, Operate, Transfer 
Build, Own, Operate 
 





Buy, Build, Operate 
Buy, Operate 
 
Roth advocates making roads commercial. He suggests that those willing 
to provide roads be able  to do so. In order for  that to happen, a reliable 
payment mechanism must be developed, and road assets must be vested in 
owners (public or private) whose interests are to use the assets effectively. 
Thus  a  rethinking  about  roads  from  a  public  commons  to  a  commercial 
enterprise must take place. The introduction of public–private partnerships is 
a step in that direction, in that it forces a reconsideration of the roles of roads 
in the broader economy. Moreover, to raise both the quality and accessibility 
of services in key areas of transport the role of public–private partnerships, 
or outsourcing, has become a topic of intense debate. 
During  the  1990s  outsourcing  was  ideally  considered  a  rather  blunt 
instrument to push down the public sector expenditure. As early adopters of 
outsourcing have discovered, simply handing over one part of the business 
may  have  an  instant  impact  on  the  bottom  line  but  it  rarely  acts  as  the 
catalyst  for  transforming  services,  operations  or  management.  Having  the 
public sector budgets more scrutiny than ever, now it is the time to explore 
the real potential for partnering the public, private and not-for-profit sectors. 
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Recent researches related to outsourcing have been made in different areas 
including  e-commerce,  restructured  electricity  markets,  firm  behavior  in 
oligopoly markets, and the organization of firms and vertical relationships 
(Kroszner and Strahan 1999, Chevalier and Glenn Ellison 1999, Borenstein 
and Farrell 1999). Hubbard (1998) has used data on the trucking industry to 
explore  the  organization  of  trucking  firms  and  shippers’  decisions  to 
purchase or provide their own transportation. In particular, Hubbard (1998) 
studied the development of onboard computer technologies investigating the 
determinants  of  diffusion  for  this  technology  and  its  implications  for  the 
choice between company drivers and owner-operators. Due to the economics 
importance of outsourcing, it is essential to evaluate if its implementation 
will be successful or not. Even tough it is not simple to evaluate a Public–






Measuring the successful implementation of a Public–Private Partnership can 
be  a  controversial  issue.  PPP  evaluation  process  has  to  take  into  account 
parameters including: 
 
•  The support for the PPP project by the public, government, politicians, 
and private firms. 
•  The satisfaction of stated objectives (costs, demand, timetable). 
•  The extension of the project or undertaking of new projects with similar 
parties. 
•  The  project  improves  the  efficiency  of  the  system,  the  equity  of  the 
system, the environment, and the experience of neighbors to, and users of, 
the project. 
 
The economic success of most partnerships for local governments clearly rests on 
healthy competition among the private partners. Those partnerships in which two 
public  partners  competed  for  the  business  of  a  private  partner  have  been 
financially disastrous (Performance Perspective 1999). 
 
It has been asserted that Public–Private Partnerships work best if the roles 
and  responsibilities  for  each  partner  are  defined.  The  government  is 
responsible for defining the details of the objectives, and that the standards 
are met and enforced to ensure the public’s benefit and safety. The private 
businesses operating efficiently to be profitable take risks in new approaches 
and designs that the government is not always able to achieve. Long-term 
value for money will depend on how well the private sector manages the risk 
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transferred to it, and on the public sector’s success to manage the contracts 
which can last for more than 30 years. 
An empirical model shaping the success (or failure) of PPP is a function 
of a number of factors: 
 
S= f(xi)      with i=1,…N  (13.1) 
 
where N represents the total number of factors affecting the project. Among 
the main factors one can mention are the experience of partners with PPP, 
the share (support) of private investors, the social acceptance of the projects, 
and timely and cost effectiveness of the project, among other ones. 
One can easily observe about the complexity of determining the specifics 
– dependent variables, homogeneity and degree – of such a model. Studies 
are being made to capture exactly what kind of model should be applied but 
none has up to this time been fully described. When evaluating the results of 
such  projects,  on  a  regular  basis,  a  group  capable  of  representing  all 
stakeholders’  views  must  be  convened.  Then,  an  evaluation  of  the 
partnership must be realized in response to performance against indicators, 
unexpected  risks,  benefits  identified  and  evolving  needs  (Hodges  and 
Grayson 2001). The ideal scenario is to obtain a model similar to Equation 
(13.1) such as: 
 
S= f(xi)   = w1 x1 + w2 x2 +…+ wn xn  (13.2) 
 
where: - xi would represent factors of the project, as already stated, such as 
social acceptance of the project, support of private investors and so on; - wi 
would represent weights to be determined. 
Having  gathered  information  of  a  number  of  projects  (the  social 
acceptance and private support for each project, for instance), the weights wi 
could then be obtained, and Equation (13.2) could be used to forecast if a 
project to be initiated would be a successful one or not. As it is beyond the 
scope  of  this  chapter  to  obtain  such  a  model,  for  illustrative  purposes  a 
simpler approach has been applied on this research. We have assumed that 
all parameters wi have the same weight and sum one (Σ wi = 1), and the 
score to the factors xi will vary from 10 (a success) to 0 (a failure). A total of 
four  factors,  xi,  are  used  on  this  chapter:  the  society  and  Government 
acceptance;  the project being concluded on budget  and on schedule.  This 
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This section considers in depth several cases of application of Public–Private 
Partnerships. We do this not to evaluate the specific cases, but to establish 
what are the criteria that lead to success or failure of PPP and to determine if 
there are underlying factors that can be used in prediction helping to shape 
future investments. 
 
Ireland – The Dublin Luas Tram System 
 
The Dublin Light  Rail Transit (LRT) System, the Luas  tram system, is a 
state-of-the-art  system  connecting  the  Dublin  city  center  with  convenient 
stop  locations  and  excellent  levels  of  comfort  and  safety.  Luas  has  high 
capacity and frequency services running on two tramlines: (i) the Red Line, 
connecting  Tallaght  to  Connolly,  approximately  48  minutes  total  journey 
time;  (ii)  the  Green  Line,  connecting  Sandyford  to  St.  Stephen’s  Green, 
approximately  22  minutes  total  journey  time.  It  is  a  project  that  can  be 
classified as a DBFO (Design–Build–Finance–Operate) type of PPP project, 
an extension of a DBO (Design–Build–Operate) type of PPP project. 
 
History 
Since 1995, the Irish Government’s approach to the provision of new public 
transport infrastructure was that any proposal should be examined in the first 
instance  for  its  potential  as  a  PPP.  In  particular,  being  the  Government 
resources  available finite  and stretched to the limit, the Irish Government 
decided  to  favor  full  DBFO,  Design–Build–Finance–Operate,  PPP  project 
whenever the circumstances allow (Department of Public Enterprise 2000). 
The Luas system was one of these first PPP projects where the private sector 
is responsible for the designing, building and financing of the project, having 
also the concession to operate the project for a number of years. 
In 1996, the government of Ireland said that the proposed Luas system 
would be in operation by 2001. In December 2000, the competition for the 
operation  of  Luas  lines  was  initiated.  Nevertheless,  the  Government  of 
Ireland approved only in 2002 the construction of the initial Luas system 
comprising 2 surface lines: Line A from Tallaght to Connolly Station, and 
Line  B  from  Sandyford  to  St  Stephen’s  Green  using  the  Harcourt  Street 
disused railway alignment. Despite all the troubles, the first completed line 
of  the  city’s  light  rail  Luas  system,  linking  Sandyford  and  St  Stephen’s 
Green (the Green line), opened to the public on 30 June 2004. Afterwards, 
the  second  line  was  inaugurated  on  28  September  2004.  The  Tallaght  to 
Connolly station line has the capacity to carry 2,800 passengers every hour in 
each  direction,  and  the  Sandyford  to  St.  Stephen’s  Green  line  has  the 
capacity for a further 4,600 passengers per hour in each direction. Nowadays, 
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the trams work from Monday to Sunday with a frequency of every 5 minutes 
at peak times.  
 
Financial Assistance 
In 1996, the government said the Luas tram system would cost €279 million 
being in operation by 2001. By 2001, the cost had more than doubled to €635 
million  and  the  start  date  put  back  to  2003.  By  the  end  of  2003,  it  was 
learned that the Luas contractor would receive a bonus if it completed the 
light rail system by its June (to the Sandyford line) and August 2004 (the 
Tallaght  line)  deadlines  under  a  new  deal  agreed  with  the  Railway 
Procurement Agency (RPA). Under the new agreement, there was a bonus if 
the construction finished on time with the contractors buying some of the 
risk. The bonus payment was included in the RPA’s latest 2003 Luas cost 
estimates of €775 million, including the risk fund of €84 million. 
 
Discussion 
The building of the Luas project in Ireland shows many of the problems that 
can arise during  the execution of a PPP project.  Even by 2003, one year 
before the inauguration of the first Luas line, there was news stating that the 
cost was heading for €1 billion, and that the two unconnected lines would not 
be in service before 2005 (The Sunday Business Post 31/08/03). A number of 
issues discussed included: unnecessary traffic delays and missed construction 
deadlines, failure to deal with disrupted businesses, poor site management 
and lack of concern for pedestrians. Nevertheless, the Government of Ireland 
has  stated  that  systems  similar  to  Luas  are  popular  worldwide  being  the 
obvious choice for a dynamic capital city like Dublin, connecting suburbs to 
the city center with a high capacity and high frequency service.  
 
Portugal, Tagus River Bridge, Lisbon 
 
The Portuguese Government decided to build a new bridge in 1991 to the 
east of Lisbon, through the river Tagus. This new bridge called ‘Vasco da 
Gama’ bridge was completed slightly ahead of schedule in March 1998. It 
had a total cost of €1 billion being financed by the private sector and the 
European Union. It is a 17km bridge that eases traffic congestion in Lisbon 
because traffic traveling between the north and south of the country is more 
easily able to bypass the capital. It is a project that can be classified as a 
DBO (Design–Build–Operate) type of PPP one. 
 
History 
The Portuguese Government created in 1991 the Office for the Crossing of 
the Tagus at Lisbon called GATTEL. Since the Tagus estuary at Lisbon is 
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very broad, up to 20km in places, any new crossing would be an expensive 
and  technically  challenging  enterprise.  By  September  1991,  GATTEL 
concluded a series of studies discarding the construction of a possible tunnel 
as  a  solution.  GATTEL  compared  three  corridors  for  a  new  road  bridge: 
eastern  (Sacavém  Montijo),  central  (Chelas  Barreiro)  and  western  
(Algés-Trafaria). After economical and environmental analysis, the Sacavém 
Montijo bridge project was chosen, later being called the Vasco da Gama 
bridge.  
Legislation was approved to establish the location and financing model of 
the bridge, based on a joint concession of the new and the existing bridge. In 
April 1994, following a lengthy procedure, the consortium called Lusoponte 
won the concession contract. To prepare for the Lusoponte takeover in 1996, 
the tolls of the existing bridge were raised in June 1994. Even though there 
were further discussions regarding environmental and social issues during 
the implementation of the project, the Vasco da Grama bridge was finally 
completed in March 1998. 
 
Financial Assistance 
The lower cost was one of the chief arguments to justify the option for the 
location of the Vasco da Gama bridge, even tough this argument is disputed 
by some social parties including Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs). 
The contract between the Portuguese Government and Lusoponte established 
that  the  financial  risks  should  fall  to  Lusoponte,  and  the  revenues  of  the 
concession should come from tolls. Lusoponte won the contract not only for 
the new Vasco da Gama bridge but also obtained the right to explore the 
already existing bridge, called ‘25 of April’, which was built in 1966.  
The 30 year term cash flow of Lusoponte amounts to about €2 billion, 
according to the Ministry of Planning (MPAT 1994). Lusoponte is receiving 
an income from a toll charged for the 15 minute drive across the Vasco da 
Gama bridge, which by the year 1998 was expected to carry up to 130,000 
vehicles per day. The consortium Lusoponte has the right to the reposition of 
financial equilibrium, if legislative changes have a significant direct impact 
on revenues or operation costs of the crossings. 
 
Discussion 
The building of the Vasco da Gama bridge complements the construction of 
a rail link along the existing 25 of April bridge, further west along the Tagus 
River  in  Lisbon.  Financed  mainly  by  private  sector  and  European  Union 
cohesion funds, the project was completed slightly ahead of schedule. This 
was one of the most controversial public works ever developed in Portugal. 
Nevertheless,  for  many  Portuguese  lawmakers,  the  new  Vasco  da  Gama 
bridge symbolizes the spirit with which Portugal modernized itself at the end 
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of the millennium. With the experience gained in the implementation of this 
Public–Private Project, Portugal and the European Union hope to have made 
the implementation of PPP projects easier and more efficient.  
 
Alameda Corridor, California 
 
The Alameda Corridor is a system of rail routes connecting the ports of Los 
Angeles and Long Beach to downtown Los Angeles, California, 20 miles 
north. The ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, also known as the San 
Pedro Bay Ports, in the 1990s became the busiest ports in the United States 
due to the enormous expansion in trade with the Pacific Rim nations. Los 
Angeles and Long Beach ports are first and second in the United States for 
container shipments, with 5.18 and 4.46 million TEUs (20 foot equivalent 
units) respectively for the year 2001. The San Pedro Bay ports are third in 
the world for container shipments, behind Hong Kong (17.8 million TEU) 
and Singapore (15.5 million TEU) (Goodwin 2002). Congestion on the rail 
routes caused congestion for Alameda Street  that parallels the rail routes. 
The Alameda Corridor project aimed to increase efficiency in movement of 
cargo throughout the United States and to overseas markets. It is a project 
that can be classified as a DBO (Design–Build–Operate) type of PPP project. 
 
History 
The Southern  California Association of Governments (SCAG) formed the 
Ports  Advisory  Committee  (PAC)  in  October  1981  with  the  goal  of 
improving  the  transportation  system  for  highway  and  rail  access.  PAC 
members included local elected officials, representatives of the ports of Los 
Angeles and Long Beach, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
the  railroads,  the  trucking  industry,  and  the  Los  Angeles  County 
Transportation Commission (LACTC). First, PAC dealt with the problems of 
highway  access  to  the  ports.  The  committee  recommended  numerous 
highway improvements, such as the widening of certain streets, which were 
completed in 1982. Rail access and the impact of future train traffic on the 
northern communities of the corridor were determined next. Three routing 
alternatives were analyzed and it was concluded that consolidating the trains 
on an up-graded Southern Pacific San Pedro Branch right-of-way would be 
the most efficient alternative. This phase was completed in 1984. 
The Alameda Corridor Task Force (ACTF) was created in February 1985 
by SCAG, with members similar to that of PAC, plus the addition of the 
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and each of the cities along 
the corridor. The ACTF concluded that a Joint Powers Authority should be 
created  to  have  design  and  construction  responsibility  for  the  Alameda 
Corridor.  The  Alameda  Corridor  Transportation  Authority  (ACTA)  was 
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created in August of 1989 by the cities of Long Beach and Los Angeles. A 
seven-member board representing the cities and ports of Long Beach and Los 
Angeles and the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority 
(MTA) governs ACTA. The Alameda Corridor Project was opened on April 




The  ACTA  believed  that  the  project  was  not  going  to  be  accomplished 
without intervention and invited Congressmen and other elected officials to 
the ports to see the seriousness of the situation. Congress in 1995 identified 
the Alameda Corridor as a ‘Project of National Significance’, which secured 
federal funding for the project. Congress appropriated $57 million as a loan 
for the project in 1997. The U.S. Department of Transportation authorized a 
$400 million 30 year loan for the project in 1998. The ports provided $394 
million for the purchase of right-of-way and start-ups. ACTA sold also $1.2 
billion revenue bonds in January 1999. The remaining funding came from 
California  state  grants  and  sources  administered  by  the  Los  Angeles 
Metropolitan  Transportation  Authority.  The  total  financing  package  was 
approximately $2.43 billion (Hankla 2001). The loans, grants, and bonds will 
be repaid by user fees from the railroads, ranging from $15 for a 20 foot and 
$30 for a 40 foot container.  
 
Discussion 
The Alameda Corridor was completed on time and on budget. The objectives 
of  the  project  were  to  reduce  highway  traffic  delays,  increase  rail 
productivity,  reduce  accidents,  and  improve  air  quality  due  to  fewer 
emissions  from  congested  vehicles  and  trains.  It  consolidated  the  Union 
Pacific/Southern Pacific (UP) and the Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) 
90  miles  of  rail  into  20  miles.  The  entire  Alameda  Corridor  project 
eliminated  or  severely  reduced  200  at-grade  railroad  crossings  and  added 
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Source: Wikipedia – Alameda Corridor (2007) 
 
Figure 13.1  Map of the Alameda Corridor 
 
People  credited  this  success  to  using  Design–Build  instead  of  the  
Design–Bid–Build  process  for  the  trench  construction  in  particular.  Time 
savings are estimated at 14 to 20 months. The process divided the risk among 
the partners, quality construction was achieved, scope creep was avoided, 
and contractor-initiated changes were less than 3 percent. Job training and 
local hire goals were reached (Doherty 2002). The Alameda Corridor Project 
had to overcome many obstacles, but with the joint effort of the public and 
private  sectors  a  significant  economic  and  environmental  benefit  to 




Dulles Greenway, Virginia 
 
The Dulles Greenway is a 22.5km (14 mile) western extension of the Dulles 
Toll  Road. It connects Washington Dulles International Airport with U.S. 
Route 15, Leesburg. It consisted of seven interchanges, 36 bridges, a toll 
plaza, 12 ramp toll barriers, an administration building, and four operational 
lanes  at  the  beginning  of  operation.  It  allowed  for  construction  of  two 
additional lanes, two  additional interchanges, and for a rail system  in the 
median (Advanced Transportation Technology News 1995). It is a project 
that can be classified as a DBO (Design–Build–Operate) type of PPP project. 
 
History 
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Dulles Greenway, Virginia, is one of the first toll highways in the United 
States that was designed, built, and financed by the private sector since the 
end of the nineteenth century turnpike era. The Dulles Greenway originated 
in  1988  with  the  Virginia  General  Assembly  authorizing  the  private 
development of toll roads. Dulles Greenway is the fourth highway segment 
comprising the Dulles Transportation Corridor. The first main highway in the 
corridor was the Dulles Airport Access Road (DAAR). This was built by the 
Federal  Aviation  Agency  (FAA)  and  opened  in  1962  along  with  the 
Washington Dulles International Airport. Then the Virginia Department of 
Transportation (VDOT) built the Dulles Toll Road (DTR), which opened in 
1984.  Next,  the  third  highway  segment,  was  the  Dulles  Access  Road 
Extension (DARE), extending eastward from the DAAR and DTR to I-66 by 
Falls Church and it was completed in 1985 (Kozel 1997).  
 
Financial Assistance 
Toll  Road  Investors  Partnership  II  (TRIP  II)  owns  the  Dulles  Greenway. 
TRIP II is comprised of Lochnau Ltd., Autostrada International from Italy, 
and Kellogg Brown and Root, Inc. Autostrada Internatonal operates the toll 
systems and Kellogg Brown and Root is the general contractor. Lochnau Ltd. 
is the main investor with a stake of $68 million. The potential return ranges 
from negative  to a Virginia  Commonwealth limit of 30 percent.  Lochnau 
Ltd. owns property in the vicinity and may have substantial profits in land 
appreciation due to increase development. The $350 million project is being 
financed  by  long-term,  fixed-rate  notes  due  in  2022  and 2026,  under  the 
direction  of  CIGNA  Investments,  Prudential,  and  John  Hancock 
(Engineering News-Record 1993). The initial toll was $1.75 each way and 
did not vary either with the length traveled along the highway or the time of 
day. The volume of traffic averaged 11,000 vehicles daily compared with 
initial estimates of 25,000 vehicles per day (The  Washington Post 1996). 
Suggestions for increasing patrons included: lowering the toll for non-rush 
hours  and  weekends,  pricing  comparable  for  length  traveled  along  the 
highway, better marketing strategies, increasing the speed limit from 55mph 
to 65mph, and establishing electronic tolling.  
The Virginia Senate, in February 1996, passed bills allowing the Dulles 
Greenway to have a speed limit of 65mph and to obtain Federal Highway 
loans.  The  toll  was  reduced  from  $1.75  to  $1.00  in  1996,  doubling  the 
volume, but TRIP II missed a $7 million interest payment to its creditors and 
a $3.6 million payment to the State of Virginia in July 1996 (The Washington 
Post 1996). TRIP II was given time to refinance the $350 million debt and 
succeeded it in April 1999. A higher speed limit of 65mph, electronic toll 
collection,  and  a  frequent  user  program  were  credited  with  the  highway 
having a flow of 40,000 vehicles per day in 1999 (PR Newswire 1999). 
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Development expanded significantly in 1999 with MCI WorldCom and 
America Online (AOL) having offices in the corridor. Tolls were increased 
for the Dulles Greenway to $1.40 for cash and $1.15 for electronic payment. 
Future  population  projections  resulted  in  TRIP  II  expanding  the  Dulles 
Greenway. Construction for an eastbound lane began in June 2000 and was 
completed in December 2000. The westbound lane began construction in the 
Spring of 2001 and was completed in August 2001. Construction costs for 
the  additional  five  miles  of  two  lanes  were  estimated  at  $10.4  million 
(Sullivan 2000). Usage of  the Dulles  Greenway  increased to over 60,000 




The Dulles Greenway is one of the few experiments with private building 
and financing of a project that had in the past been accomplished with public 
resources. The risks that  the private partners  incurred were:  an extremely 
large leveraged debt, a long time frame before profitability, a project subject 
to  economic  downturns,  and  competition  from  no  toll  roads.  In  addition, 
Dulles  Greenway  could  not  raise  its  toll  above  $2.00  unless  the  Virginia 
State Corporation Commission (SCC) gave TRIP II permission. The main 
advantage that the Dulles Greenway highway realized was the willing of the 
lenders to negotiate and wait for payments. Moreover, the highway was built 
in an area that was expanding and growing rapidly. 
 
 
13.5 APPLICATION OF THE MODEL 
 
Measuring the successful implementation of a Public–Private Partnership can 
be very controversial because the public, government and private agents can 
have  complete  different  views  about  the  PPP  implementation.  As  it  was 
previously stated, a total of four factors, xi, are used on the applied model: 
the  society  and  Government  acceptance;  the  project  being  concluded  on 
budget and on schedule. Prior to analyze the results obtained, some caution 
comments must be made.  
First, in the cases where not all society agents were in accordance to the 
PPP implementation, the score of 10 meaning full approval by the society 
was not given. In particular, the society approval score of 0 was given to the 
Lisbon project due to all the controversial statements given about it, even 
after  its  conclusion.  Second,  the  score  for  the  Government  approval  was 
considered 10 for the four cases because the main government agents had 
always a favorable view about the PPP implementation. Third, if the projects 
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were  realized  on  time  and  on  budget,  a  score  of  10  was  given  to  those 
factors; otherwise, a score of 0 was given. 
The  model  described  in  Equation  13.2  is  then  applied  assuming  the 
weights, wi, to be identical to 0.25 (wi = 0.25). By the results stated on Table 
13.2, the projects of the Alameda Corridor and the Dulles Greenway were 
the  ones  with  the  highest  scores  equal  to  8.75.  The  projects  of  the  Luas 
System and the Tagus river bridge obtained the lowest scores identical to 
5.00. These differences in the projects’ scores were because both the Dublin 
and the Lisbon projects had at least two factors rated 0, while none of the 
factors in the USA projects had a 0 score. This illustrative example shows 
how valuable such a tool can be to better quantify the success of a project. 
 
Table 13.2  Measures of Success for Public–Private Partnerships (MSPPP) 
for Selected Projects 
 




Budget  On 
Schedule 
Score - S 
Ireland – Luas 
System 
(Dublin) 









5  10  10  10  8.75 
USA – Dulles 
Greenway 
(Virgina) 
5  10  10  10  8.75 
An important note must be added regarding the chosen factors: society 
and government approval, on budget, and on schedule. As it was previously 
said, the ideal scenario would be to develop a model where having gathered 
the data set for a number of projects, the model could be calibrated obtaining 
the  wi  values.  Then  it  could  be  asked:  how  to  forecast  the  score  of  an 
incipient PPP project not knowing if the project will be concluded on time 
and on budget?  
To solve the above problem, we can observe the private investors that are 
participating in the PPP projects, discovering what other projects they have 
taken part in the past. Then, it can be obtained approximate scores to their 
respective factors, depending on if they have finished their past projects on 
time and on budget. Finally, the model could then be applied to forecast how 
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successful will be the just initiated PPP project. As one can see, this is an 




13.5 APPLICATION OF THE MODEL 
 
Public–Private  Partnerships  are  aimed  at  increasing  the  delivery  of  road 
services in an era of public financial constraints by using resources of the 
private sector for public aims. In that sense, it aims to improve the efficiency 
of  service  delivery  providing  more  service  for  less  government  outlay. 
However, it has been limited because of a variety of reasons including a clear 
reluctance of the public sector to fully privatize roads. The risks of course are 
that the public and private sectors have different interests, the government is 
ideally concerned with maximizing welfare while firms aim for profit.  
We  observe  that  successful  PPPs  have  well-defined  roles  that  both 
improve  the  quality  and  quantity  of  transportation  and  provide  at  least  a 
normal profit to private participants. We measured success across a number 
of criteria, including a general assessment of the support for the project by 
the  various  stakeholders:  public,  government  (civil  service),  political,  and 
private; looking at adherence to initial forecasts (on-time, on-budget, demand 
realized);  considering  whether  the  project  was  extended  or  the  parties 
undertook additional projects (success breeds success); and considering more 
objective assessments of whether  the project served the public good (was 
efficiency,  equity, the environment, and  the  experience of users and non-
users alike improved?).  
Public–Private  Partnerships  represent  a  flexible  solution  to  establish 
infrastructure  services.  Moreover,  PPPs  involve  the  sharing  of  risks  and 
responsibilities  between  public  and  private  sectors.  Notwithstanding  the 
positive  commitment  in  the  United  States  and  in  Europe  towards  
Public–Private  Partnerships,  there  are  still  obstacles  to  be  overcome  to 
promote the PPP concept more widely. In many European countries there is 
no  legal  framework  for  PPPs.  To  implement  PPPs,  a  robust  system  of 
commercial laws needs to be  in place. Private sector interests have  to be 
protected under the existing laws, and government agencies have to facilitate 
the  involvement  of  the  private  sector  in  infrastructure  projects  or  public 
utilities.  
In Northern European countries, a PPP formula is being envisaged for a 
sustainable  development  strategy,  integrating  economic,  social  and 
environmental dimensions. It has been observed that all modes of transport 
are likely to expand and future PPP projects must also reinforce links with 
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the rest of Europe, and especially to improve the inter-modal capacities of 
port terminals.  
The  perception  of  high  risk  attached  to  lending  on  project  finance  in 
Southeast Europe is also difficult to overcome, deterring private commercial 
banks from lending to the region. Country credit risk is an important factor 
as  private  commercial  banks  are  frequently  reluctant  to  enter  Southeast 
European  markets,  due  to  the  general  legal  and  regulatory  weakness 
characterizing these markets. In the medium term, as the Southeast European 
countries economies will progressively develop, the PPP market will grow. 
This chapter also describes a new approach to ‘measure’ the success of 
Public–Private  Partnerships.  Further  research  must  be  made  not  only  to 
determine  the  robustness  of  the  new  approach  but  also  to  include  other 
parameters  in  the  proposed  model.  Discussions  to  determine  the 
independence  of  the  parameters  must  also  be  taken  because  if  the 
government  approves  a  PPP  project,  it  can  strongly  market  it  possibly 
affecting the personal approval ratings of the society. Nevertheless, one can 
say  that  the  proposed  approach  can  be  applied  to  give  an  idea  about  the 
quality of a PPP initiative. 
Despite  all  the  challenges,  Public–Private  Partnerships  have  become 
increasingly attractive as reflected in many global infrastructure initiatives. 
As  PPPs  can  also  achieve  social  and  environmental  objectives,  PPPs  can 
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